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EXECUTING THE INNOCENT: HOW TO REMEDY
A STATE'S WRONG
NICOLE MEGALE
INTRODUCTION
Carlos DeLuna, executed in the State of Texas in 1989, at the age of 27,
left behind nine siblings.' His mother became extremely ill after hearing
that DeLuna was arrested for murder and died two weeks after DeLuna's
trial.2 DeLuna's whole family was shocked by the news that he was a
murderer and believed it was impossible. 3 According to them, DeLuna was
just not that type of guy. 4 Yes, he had a criminal record, but something as
extreme as murder was not possible for DeLuna.5 DeLuna's younger sister,
Rose, said that DeLuna was afraid of the dark and of Chihuahuas; he could
not kill someone. 6 The evidence against DeLuna, however, seemed
compelling.
Carlos DeLuna was sentenced to death for murdering Wanda Lopez
during a supposed gas station robbery that occurred on February 4, 1983.7
Police found DeLuna hiding under a pickup truck a few blocks from the
crime scene. 8 In his pocket was a rolled up wad of $149.9 This was not
I See James S. Liebman et al., Los Tocayos Carlos: Part I; The Death of Wanda Lopez, 43 COLuM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 724, 790 (2012) [hereinafter Liebman, Carlos Part 1].
2 See id
3 See id. at 796.
4 See id
5 See id
6 See id
7 See Michael McLoughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution: Texas Put to Death an Innocent Man,
Columbia University Team Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/15/carlos-de-luna-execution- n 1507003.html [hereinafter
McLoughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution]. Robert Stange, the gas station store's manager, said he had his
doubts that the robbery was in fact a robbery. See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 759, 782. To
him, it seemed as though Lopez tried to give her murderer the money while or after being stabbed. See
id. at 776-77, 782. Additionally, Stange said Lopez was aware of the store's protocol and would have
given up the money in the cash register immediately. See id. at 774. Therefore, he believed this murder
was about more than a mere gas station robbery. Id. at 782. In fact, Stange recalled there being rumors
about someone having it out for Lopez, but the police never looked into these rumors. See id. at 782.
8 See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 747-48.
9 McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
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DeLuna's first run in with the law;10 in fact, DeLuna was paroled just
thirty-six days prior to the murder, after having been in jail for violating
parole."l
Multiple eyewitnesses identified DeLuna as the murderer. 12 One
eyewitness, Kevan Baker, was asked by police to do a show-up
identification at the crime scene. 13 Normally, witnesses are asked to
identify a suspect through a line-up of different people; a show-up
identification, however, occurs when a witness is asked to identify a
suspect face-to-face.1 4 After some hesitation, Baker agreed to participate in
the show-up identification and identified DeLuna as the man he saw run
out of the store after murdering Lopez.' 5 The police were convinced that
DeLuna was the man they were looking for.
A more thorough analysis of the evidence, however, shows that
DeLuna's family was right: DeLuna was not Lopez's murderer. The
majority of the evidence against DeLuna was actually quite weak. First,
the key evidence in convicting DeLuna-the eyewitness statements-
actually conflicted with one another.1 6 For example, Baker described the
murderer as having a moustache and beard growth, while another
eyewitness, Julie Arsuaga, described the murderer as clean shaven.17
Second, the makeup of the crime scene suggested that the murderer would
likely have blood on his shoes and pants, but DeLuna did not have any
blood on him, nor was there any blood on the money in his pocket.1 8 The
bills found left in the store, though, did have blood on them.1 9 Third, the
store's manager, Robert Stange, said that the cash register would never
have more than $75 in it.20 In fact, bills worth $20 or more were not even
10 See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 804 (noting that none of DeLuna's previous crimes
involved the use of a weapon).
I1 Id at 806.
12 See McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
13 Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 757.
14 See id
15 See id. When later interviewed, Baker said he was unsure whether DeLuna had actually been the
man he saw running out of the store, specifically noting the difficulty he has with identifying cross
cultures. See id. at 765. Baker said he was only seventy percent sure DeLuna was the man he saw. Id.
Additionally, he noted that cops told Baker that DeLuna was found under the truck and that, because of
this information, Baker thought DeLuna must be the guy, but without this information, he would have
only been fifty percent sure that DeLuna was the man he saw. Id.
16 See McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
17 See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 739.
18 See McLoughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
19 See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 776.
20 See id. at 774; see also James S. Liebman, et al., Los Tocayos Carlos: Part III: The Prosecution
of Carlos DeLuna, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 908, 951 (2012) [hereinafter Liebman, Carlos: Part
III] (noting that DeLuna's lawyers never received any of the information regarding the store's cash
374
EXECUTVG THE INNOCENT
put into the cash register; they were deposited directly into a safe. 21 After
the incident, the key and the drop slot safes were found locked and
untouched. 22 Thus, Stange said that Lopez tried to give the murderer
money from the register 23 and that the murderer could not have left with
more than $20.24 DeLuna, however, was found with $149, which included
some $20 bills.25
The weaknesses of the above evidence are enhanced by the fact that
there was actually another suspect that the police should have had on their
radar. There were tips that Carlos Hernandez had actually murdered
Lopez, but the police failed to thoroughly look into these tips. 26 In fact,
Hernandez and DeLuna bore a similar resemblance to one another, which
could explain the misidentifications by eyewitnesses.27 Additionally,
Hernandez always carried a knife on him; people close to Hernandez later
identified a picture of Lopez's murder weapon as Hernandez's knife.28
Hernandez actually admitted to the crime on a couple of occasions and
numerous people confessed to knowing that Hernandez had actually
murdered Lopez.29
This compelling evidence illustrates that DeLuna was likely innocent.30
In fact, the executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center
(DPIC), Richard Dieter, stated that, "if a new trial was somehow able to be
conducted today, a jury would acquit DeLuna." 31
DeLuna is not the first probably innocent person to be executed.
Cameron Todd Willingham was executed in 2004 in Texas for killing his
register policies).
21 See Liebman, Carlos Part I, supra note 1, at 774.
22 Id. at 782.
23 Id. at 776.
24 Id. at 784. There was $55 of loose cash in the store, so the most the murderer could have taken
was $20, rather than $75. See id
25 See Liebman, Carlos: Part III, supra note 20, at 914.
26 See McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
27 See James S. Liebman et al., Los Tocayos Carlos: Part II: The Lives of Carlos Hernandez, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 816, 898 (2012) [hereinafter Liebman, Carlos Part Il] ("A number of
friends and family members of the two men mistakenly identified photographs of one Carlos, whom
they'd never met, as the other.").
28 See id. at 824-25.
29 See McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7; see also Liebman, Carlos Part II,
supra note 27, at 878-79 (stating how one person, Janie, overheard Hernandez saying that he hurt Lopez
and that DeLuna took the fall for him).
30 James Liebman, a professor at Columbia University School of Law, uncovered the above
evidence and the full story about DeLuna. See McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
The full story, along with audiotapes, photographs, and other materials, can be found on the Columbia
Human Rights Law Review website. See The Wrong Carlos, http://thewrongcarlos.net/ (last visited
Mar. 16, 2015).
31 McLaughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution, supra note 7.
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three daughters in a house fire.32 However, evidence later showed that the
fire was actually accidental. 33 In 2010, District Court Judge Charlie Baird
wrote an order to posthumously exonerate Willingham; however, the order
was never filed because a higher court questioned whether Judge Baird had
the authority to examine the case. 34 The DPIC lists thirteen executions,
since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, in which there exists
compelling evidence that those executed were actually innocent; the list
includes both DeLuna and Willingham. 35 According to the DPIC, besides
wrongful executions, 156 death row inmates have been exonerated while
on death row since 1973.36 Kwame Ajamu, the 150th death row inmate
exonerated, was released from death row in Ohio on December 9, 2014,
after spending thirty-nine years on death row. 37
The execution of an innocent individual, therefore, is not out of the
realm of possibility and has likely occurred on at least thirteeen occasions.
Despite the permanency of an execution and the cruelty of executing an
innocent individual, there is currently no remedy for a wrongful execution.
Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have imposed statutes
providing compensation for wrongfully convicted and incarcerated
persons. 38 However, these compensation statutes do not explicitly account
for those who are wrongfully executed; 39 some of the statutes even deny
compensation after death.40 While it is true that the deceased do not have a
32 See Michael McLaughlin, Cameron Todd Willingham Exoneration was Written but never Filed
by Texas Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (May 19, 2012, 8:01 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/19/cameron-todd-willingham-exoneration-nI 524868.html
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Cameron Todd Willingham].
33 See id.
34 See id
35 See Executed but Possibly Innocent, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executed-possibly-innocent (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). The other eight
names on the list are Ruben Cantu, Larry Griffin, Joseph O'Dell, David Spence, Leo Jones, Gary
Graham, Claude Jones, Troy Davis, Lester Bower, Brian Terrell, and Richard Masterson. Id.
36 See The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last updated Oct. 12, 2015). To
be included on the DPIC's Innocence List, a defendant must have been convicted, sentenced to death,
and subsequently either: (a) been acquitted of all charges related to the crime that placed [the defendant]
on death row, or (b) had all charges related to the crime that placed [the defendant] on death row
dismissed by the prosecution, or (c) been granted a complete pardon based on evidence of innocence.
Id.
37 See id.
38 See Meghan J. Ryan, Article, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261,
296 (2012); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2012) (permitting recovery of up to $100,000 per year forthose
wrongly placed on death row and up to $50,000 per year for other wrongful incarcerations); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4C-5 (West 2012) (awarding up to $50,000 for each year of wrongful incarceration, or two
times the claimant's income in the year prior to incarceration).
39 Ryan, supra note 38, at 301-02.
40 Id. at 304; see, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4604(5) (2012) (stating that a claimant's cause of
action for wrongful conviction and incarceration will not survive the claimant's death).
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pressing need for monetary compensation, it is shocking that a punishment
of such permanent proportions does not have some sort of remedy to at
least attempt to reconcile the harm caused to those innocents executed and
their families.
Typically, when harm is caused to an individual by another, tort law
attempts to remedy the situation by providing some form of compensation
to the injured individual. This applies even in cases where the injured
individual is deceased, through the use of both survival claims and
wrongful death claims. 41 When the state government, however, is the cause
of an individual's injury, the government is protected from tort liability
through sovereign immunity.42 Therefore, in the case of Carlos DeLuna, or
any other wrongfully executed individual, neither DeLuna's estate nor
DeLuna's family could sue under a survival claim or wrongful death claim,
respectively, because those responsible for DeLuna's execution are
protected under sovereign immunity.
This Note explores states' sovereign immunity and suggests the
abrogation of sovereign immunity in instances of wrongful execution. Part
I discusses the Eighth Amendment and examines how the execution of an
innocent individual constitutes a violation of one's Eighth Amendment
rights. Part II examines states' sovereign immunity and how such
immunity can be waived or abrogated. It also looks at instances where
Congress has previously abrogated states' sovereign immunity. Part III
suggests that, when an innocent individual is executed, Congress utilizes its
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power to abrogate sovereign immunity
via clear legislation and suggests a potential framework for the legislation.
Part IV addresses any potential counterarguments to this legislation. This
Note concludes with a reexamination of the DeLuna case and attempts to
determine its outcome under the suggested legislation.
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
41 See Runyun v. Dist. of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (explaining that
survival actions are brought by the estate of the deceased on behalf of the deceased to recover for the
deceased's personal injury and that wrongful death actions are brought in the interest of the deceased's
spouse and next of kin); see, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8302 (Pennsylvania's survival statute); 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 8301 (Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see infra Part II. This Note takes the viewpoint that the State would be
the appropriate defendant in a lawsuit defending the constitutional rights of a wrongfully executed
individual. Therefore, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act would not be applicable in these lawsuits
since it subjects actual persons to liability rather than the State itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 43 In Furman v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment's protection against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.44 Furman was overruled four years later by Gregg v.
Georgia.45 The Supreme Court stated that its main concern in Furman was
that the state death penalty statutes allowed for juries to arbitrarily impose
the death penalty, thus, making it cruel and unusual. 46 Since Furman, the
State of Georgia revised its death penalty statute and imposed guidelines
for when a death penalty sentence could be applied.47 These guidelines
took away the arbitrariness of the prior system and helped to "assure that
the death penalty [would] not be imposed on a capriciously selected group
of convicted defendants." 48 Therefore, under Gregg, as long as a state
imposes proper guidelines in its death penalty statute to ensure that the
death penalty is not applied arbitrarily, imposition of the death penalty
upon a convicted defendant does not violate the cruel and unusual
punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment. 49
Since the establishment of the legality of the death penalty in Gregg,
states have chosen for themselves whether to maintain the death penalty as
a sentence for certain crimes. Currently, the death penalty is legal in thirty-
two states, the United States government, and the United States military.50
A. Herrera v. Collins: A Look at Executing Innocents and the Constitution
Arbitrary imposition of the death penalty should not be the only red flag
when it comes to the constitutionality of the death penalty. The execution
of innocent individuals also has major constitutional consequences. In fact,
the Supreme Court dealt with such an issue in Herrera v. Collins, in which
the petitioner, Herrera, claimed that "he was 'actually innocent' of the
murder for which he was sentenced to death, and that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law therefore forbid
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
44 Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
45 See Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
46 Id. at 206.
47 See id.
48 Id at 204.
49 See id. at 206-07.
50 States with and without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (listing
states with and without the death penalty).
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his execution." 51
The Court ruled against Herrera; however, this ruling was not made on
the grounds that executing an innocent individual does not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Rather, the Court ruled against Herrera because
Herrera's new evidence did not reach the Court's high threshold for
demonstrating "actual innocence," warranting federal habeas relief.52 This
is because, as both the majority and concurring opinions stated, when
Herrera was found guilty of murder, he lost the presumption of innocence
that exists for criminal defendants, thus Herrera was no longer considered
innocent in the eyes of the law.53 Therefore, the question the Court
answered in this case was not whether an innocent person can be executed,
but rather, the question was "whether a fairly convicted and therefore
legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet another judicial
proceeding ... notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate that
constitutional error infected his trial."54
Even though the Court did not have to answer any questions regarding
the constitutionality of executing an innocent individual, the Court's
opinion does contain some dicta on the topic. In the beginning of its
opinion, the Court noted that Herrera's proposition that wrongfully
executing someone violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments "has
an elemental appeal," especially since the purpose of the criminal justice
system is "to convict the guilty and free the innocent." 55 The concurring
justices agreed that "executing the innocent is inconsistent with the
Constitution" and would be a "constitutionally intolerable event." 56
The dissenting opinion in Herrera, written by Justice Blackmun, also
discussed the legality of executing an innocent individual.57 Justice
Blackmun noted that executing an innocent person would violate all
standards of decency. 58 He also said that it is "violative of the Eighth
Amendment to execute a person who is actually innocent. Executing an
innocent person epitomizes the "'purposeless and needless imposition of
51 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
52 See id. at 417.
53 See id. at 399-400. Since Herrera already had a trial and was found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, he "does not appear before [the Court] as an innocent man on the verge of execution. He is
instead a legally guilty one who, refusing to accept the jury's verdict, demands a hearing in which to
have his culpability determined once again." Id at 4 19-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54 Id at 420.
55 Id. at 398 (majority opinion).
56 Id at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57 See id. at 430-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 431.
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pain and suffering."'5 9
B. Has Herrera Affected Wrongful Executions?
While no decision was made on the legality of executing an innocent
individual, the dicta and dissenting opinion in Herrera reflect the view that
if an innocent person was executed, it would be unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment. 60 Based on the Eighth Amendment, a person has the
right to protection against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.6 1
However, if nothing is in place to enforce this right or deter others,
including the government, from violating this right, it basically becomes
null.6 2
The Court recognized that a right without a correlative remedy is, in
essence, useless in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, in which the Court allowed the petitioner to recover
monetary damages from federal agents in the agents' personal capacities
for violating the petitioner's constitutional rights.63 In Bivens, the Court
quoted Marbury v. Madison in coming to its ruling and stated that, "'[t]he
very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. '64 If this
statement from Marbury refers to all laws, then something must be done
with regards to the Eighth Amendment and the execution of innocent
persons. With sovereign immunity and the current state of the majority of
state laws, an innocent person executed on death row has no available
remedy to cure the violation of his or her Eighth Amendment right. If,
however, Congress were to abrogate state sovereign immunity in instances
where an individual is wrongfully executed, a remedy would then be
available to the deceased via survival actions.
59 Id. at 431-32 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
60 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
62 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Article, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 861 (2007) ("[A] constitutional right
without a correlative remedy is no right at all.").
63 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (permitting private suit against federal agents when those agents violated the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment right protecting against unreasonable search and seizure).
64 Id (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)).
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II. A LOOK AT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The basis of sovereign immunity is the Eleventh Amendment: "The
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." 65
The Supreme Court has verified the extent of states' sovereign immunity
in multiple cases. In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court ruled that a citizen is
barred from suing his own state in federal court, unless the state consents to
such a suit.66 In Alden, the Court ruled that non-consenting states cannot be
subjected to private suits in state courts. 67 In coming to this conclusion, the
Court not only looked at the legislative history of sovereign immunity, but
also looked at the numerous state statutory provisions waiving sovereign
immunity.68 The fact that states can, and have, used these statutory waivers
show that the states are well protected by sovereign immunity in basically
all contexts because otherwise these waivers would not exist.69
Based on these rulings and the long standing protection of sovereign
immunity, at first glance it would seem as though those innocently
executed are left in the dark when it comes to their Eighth Amendment
rights. Due to states' sovereign immunity, those innocent persons executed
do not have a means of obtaining some remedy for the wrong done to them,
thus rendering their Eighth Amendment protection ineffective and
pointless. However, a state's sovereign immunity can be removed in
certain instances in one of two ways: a state's explicit waiver of immunity
or Congress's explicit abrogation of immunity.70 If one of these avenues of
removing sovereign immunity is taken, a proper remedy through a survival
suit becomes available to those wrongfully executed.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. In Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court, however, made clear that states'
sovereign immunity, while typically referred to as coming from the Eleventh Amendment, was actually
enjoyed by the states prior to the ratification of the Constitution and has continued to be recognized by
the courts since then. 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
66 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 727.
67 See Alden 527 U.S. at 712 (implying that a "non-consenting state" is a state that has not waived
its sovereign immunity).
68 See id. at 724.
69 See id.
70 See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858) (stating that a state may not be sued without its
consent unless it waives sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73
(2000) (stating that Congress may abrogate states' sovereign immunity); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 185 (4th ed. 2011).
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A. Waiver of State Sovereign Immunity
A state may choose to waive its sovereign immunity through statute.
Most states have chosen to waive their sovereign immunity via statute in
select instances.71 Washington is the only state whose waiver statute
provides for governmental liability in a basically unlimited capacity when
the government's conduct is tortious. 72 Most waivers also limit the amount
of damages that one can receive from a suit against the unprotected
entity.73
While having a state willingly waive its immunity for wrongful
executions would be ideal, there is no way to guarantee that all death
penalty states would be willing to do so. The compensation statutes
provided by some states for any wrongful convictions and incarcerations
are certainly a start in the right direction. However, as stated earlier, many
of these statutes do not provide for compensation after death and none
explicitly take into account wrongful executions. 74 Due to the uncertainty
of states choosing to waive their immunity or invoke such compensation
provisions with regards to wrongful execution, this Note focuses instead on
a more guaranteed way of providing some form of relief for this violation
of Eighth Amendment rights: the abrogation of states' sovereign immunity
via Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 Power
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects United States citizens from any injustices
done by the states to United States citizens by making the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states. 76 Therefore, via Congress's Section 5 power,
71 See Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State's 45-Year Experiment in Government
Liability, 29 SEATTLE U.L. REv. I app. at 53-60 (2005) (listing state sovereign immunity waiver
statutes); see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 8104-A (2012) (waiving sovereign immunity in Maine
when a government entity is liable for property damage, bodily injury, or death in certain instances).
72 See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (2012) ("The state of Washington, whether acting in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to
the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."); see also Tardif & McKenna, supra note
71 (explaining the history, consequences, and extent of Washington's sovereign liability waiver).
73 See Tardif & McKenna, supra note 71, app. at 53-60 (2005) (listing any damage limitations);
see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-104 (LexisNexis 2012) (limiting recovery to $200,000).
74 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by the
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
76 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
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Congress can pass laws to enforce a person's, in this case a wrongfully
executed person's, Eighth Amendment right to be free from the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment by the state. As the Supreme Court ruled
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, this includes the power to authorize damage actions
against states, despite states' sovereign immunity, since Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to limit state sovereign immunity
by permitting private suits against states. 77
While Congress has the power to limit state sovereign immunity via the
Fourteenth Amendment, this power is restricted and, thus, only applies in a
narrow array of circumstances. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme
Court made clear that Congress does not have the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation, just the power to enforce a
constitutional right.78 This power to enforce a constitutional right "includes
the authority both to remedy and to deter violations of rights guaranteed
[under the Fourteenth Amendment]." 79 It is up to the Court to determine
whether a law passed by Congress abrogating sovereign immunity is a
valid use of Congress's Section 5 power.80
1. A Look at Congress's Utilization of its Abrogation Power
The Supreme Court has faced the question of whether Congress's use of
its Section 5 power was constitutional in five cases.81 For there to be a
constitutional abrogation of sovereign immunity, two questions must be
answered: "(1) whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate; and (2), if so, whether it acted pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority." 82 The first question is easy to determine by just
looking at the language of the statute and seeing if Congress provided for
abrogation in the statute. The second question raises more concerns. There
are three cases in which the Supreme Court ruled that Congress's use of its
Section 5 power was invalid: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
77 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of
Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797,
816-17 (2007).
78 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("Congress [does not have] the power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. [For example,]
[1]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause.").
79 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,81 (2000) (citing City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
80 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 309 (4th ed.
2011).
81 Id.
82 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 509-10 (2004) (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73).
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Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,83 Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,84 and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.85
While Congress did unequivocally express its intent to abrogate in these
instances, they were not valid uses of Congress's power to abrogate. The
Court looked at the history of violations by the state, using a rational basis
test in Kimel and Garrett, to determine the validity of Congress's
abrogation of states' sovereign immunity.86 Since none of these cases
involved a protected class of people, nor did any of the cases have a clear
showing of a violation of due process by the state, Congress's use of its
abrogation power was invalid.87
In two other cases, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs88
and Tennessee v. Lane,89 the Court ruled that Congress validly used its
abrogation power. Unlike in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett, in these
two cases, the Court applied a heightened scrutiny when determining the
validity of abrogation.90 In Hibbs, there was a gender-based issue, which is
subject to intermediate scrutiny; in Tennessee, the right involved was a
fundamental right, which is subject to heightened scrutiny.9 1 A valid use of
the abrogation power, therefore, occurs when Congress is trying to enforce
a fundamental right or the rights of a protected class of people. Therefore,
83 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress's law abrogating states' sovereign immunity in
patent infringement claims was an invalid use of Congress's Section 5 power because there was no
pattern of patent infringement, or constitutional violations with regards to patents, by the states).
84 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act exceeds
Congress's Section 5 power to validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity because, under the rational
basis test, states may discriminate based on age if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
85 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress could not abrogate states' sovereign immunity under
Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act when it did not show an irrational pattern of state
discrimination against the disabled in employment).
86 See id at 366, 374 (explaining that disability discrimination by the state must only meet the
rational basis test to be permissible, so there did not really exist a pattern of discrimination that violated
the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress was trying to prevent or remedy through abrogation); Kimel,
528 U.S. at 83, 86 ("States may discriminate based on age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.") (explaining that,
since states may discriminate based on age, Congress's abrogation of states' sovereign immunity where
there is age discrimination is not designed to prevent or respond to unconstitutional behavior); Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639-40 (explaining that the abrogation statute was not congruent or proportional to
any constitutional violation it was trying to remedy since there was no pattern of patent infringement or
a constitutional violation by the state); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 309-13 (4th ed. 2011).
87 See supra note 86; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 315.
88 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that Congress validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity under
the Family and Medical Leave Act because the law was meant to protect against gender discrimination,
which is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny).
89 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Congress validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act because there exists a fundamental right to access the
courts and fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny).
90 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 313-15.
91 See id at313-14; supra notes 88-89.
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if Congress were to abrogate sovereign immunity for a wrongfully
executed individual, it must ensure that any statute exercising the
abrogation power falls within the powers of Section 5, as expressed in these
cases, by being eligible for a heightened scrutiny test.
2. United States v. Georgia: A Quick Look at the Eighth Amendment and
Abrogation
In United States v. Georgia, the Court specifically looked at an Eighth
Amendment issue involving Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and considered whether a disabled inmate could sue the state. 92
This case distinguishes itself from the previous five cases because the
state's conduct independently violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 93 The Court found an independent violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because, while the state's conduct violated Title II
of the ADA, the conduct also directly violated the Eighth Amendment by
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon the plaintiff.94 Since the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment, any violation of the Eighth
Amendment also directly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 Since
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "grants Congress the power to
'enforce ... the provisions' of the Amendment by creating private
remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions,
'Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which
the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendments rights."' 96
Thus, with regards to a wrongful execution, there are no readily apparent
constitutional issues with abrogating states' sovereign immunity if a state
executes an innocent person. As evident in the dicta and dissent of
Herrera, executing an innocent individual would violate a person's Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 97 In turn,
a violation of a person's Eighth Amendment right is also a violation of a
person's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process which, under
92 See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006).
93 See id. at 157. This distinguishes Georgia from Hibbs and Lane because "Hibbs and Lane hold
that for rights or types of discrimination that receive heightened scrutiny, Congress has much greater
authority to permit suits against state governments than for claims that receive only rational basis
review," while Georgia is looking at a state action that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
cHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 315.
94 See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157.
95 See id. (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463).
96 Id. at 158.
97 See supra Part I.A.
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Congress's Section 5 power, Congress has a right to enforce and remedy
via statute, including by abrogating states' sovereign immunity.98
Therefore, since a statute abrogating states' sovereign immunity when a
state wrongfully executes an innocent is constitutional, the next step is to
determine whether such a statute would even be logical and what effects it
would have.
III. The Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in the Case of a Wrongful
Execution
A. Logistics Behind an Abrogation Statute
A statute abrogating states' sovereign immunity where an innocent
individual is executed needs to take into account multiple factors. Such
factors include what type of suit could be brought against the state and how
damages would be calculated in such a suit. Additionally, the statute
should address the evidentiary requirements for imposing the death penalty
in the first place and what affect these requirements should have on the
amount of damages recoverable in a lawsuit resulting from an innocent
person being executed.
1. Survival Suits
Under a survival statute, a decedent's estate may recover for the tortious
act that caused the decedent's death. 99 Therefore, in the case of a wrongful
execution, a decedent's estate could bring a suit under a survival statute for
the violation of the decedent's Eighth Amendment rights.100 Without state
liability, however, there is no conceivable defendant for such a suit; the
state is ultimately responsible for the wrongful execution, thus, the state
would be the rightful defendant in such a suit.
While wrongfully executed individuals do not have a dire need for
monetary compensation, valid reasons still exist to hold a state liable for
executing an innocent. Compensation statutes were imposed by states "to
98 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77, 94-96.
99 See Runyun v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. 1972); see also Meghan J.
Ryan, Article, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 284 (2012); see, e.g., 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (2012) (Pennsylvania's survival statute).
100 This Note does not address wrongful death actions, which are brought on behalf of a deceased's
spouse and next of kin. Congress can only abrogate sovereign immunity in certain instances,
specifically when dealing with a protected group of people or a clear violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the deceased's spouse and next of kin are not the people who actually had their
Fourteenth Amendment rights violated, abrogating states' sovereign immunity to allow for a wrongful
death action is likely an invalid use of Congress's abrogation power.
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compensate an individual for a wrong perpetrated by the government[; a]
goal which does not become obsolete once an individual has been
wrongfully executed."lot The same is true in the case of a liability suit
against the government: the goal of making a state take responsibility for
violating an individual's Eighth Amendment right does not become
obsolete once the individual can no longer physically accept compensation.
As stated earlier, without some correlative remedy, a violation of a
person's constitutional rights is irrelevant because the right is basically
non-existent. 102 The Supreme Court has made clear that the execution of an
innocent individual would violate that individual's Eighth Amendment
right to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment; with no
other available remedy, allowing the decedent's estate to sue a state under a
survival statute for this violation would make the state both take
responsibility for its action and compensate the decedent's estate for its
wrongdoing.
2. Statutory Damages Caps
Any liability imposed upon the state, however, cannot be without some
sort of cap. Statutory damages caps "preserve political pressure on
government to conform its conduct to the law but mitigate the anomalies
associated with governmental damages liability." 03 Unlimited liability
damages on a state's government could have a drastically negative effect
on the state's budget and could take money away from other pressing state
needs. Additionally, constitutional tort damages should not be based on the
presumed intrinsic value of the violated constitutional rights; rather, they
are based on the actual and compensable loss. 104 Thus, where there is a
wrongful execution, damages should not be based on the perceived value of
Eighth Amendment rights. The actual loss in these cases would, instead, be
the loss of one's life. This again, though, is not really compensable since it
is difficult to calculate and cannot be used by the decedent. The type and
amount of damages recoverable by the decedent's estate should really just
be those usually recoverable in survival actions: decedent's pain and
101 Ryan, supra note 99, at 305.
102 See supra text accompanying note 62.
103 Lawrence Rosenthal, Article, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 863 (2007).
104 See id. at 815-16. In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, the Court explained that
even if constitutional rights are denied, in order to recover compensatory damages, there must be an
actual injury. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1986). Therefore, the
intrinsic value of a constitutional right is not the basis for compensatory damages; rather, it is the actual
injury that results from the violation of those rights that is the basis for compensatory damages.
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suffering, funeral expenses, and punitive damages.1 05
Under such a compensatory scheme, punitive damages should be based
on the extent of the measures taken by the state to ensure an innocent
person is not executed. The more measures taken by a state, the less a state
should have to pay in punitive damages. Factors that could be taken into
account in determining damages include the strength of the evidence and
the value of any evidence not taken into account. In determining strength
of evidence, one could differentiate between eyewitness evidence;
biological evidence, such as DNA evidence or fingerprints; video evidence;
and any other forms of evidence.
3. Faulty Eyewitness Identifications, Evidentiary Requirements, and
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
In Carlos DeLuna's case, eyewitness identifications were really the only
substantial evidence linking DeLuna to the murder of Lopez, but those
identifications were actually quite faulty.1 06 In fact, eyewitness
misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions.107 For
example, in Texas in 2008, 84% of wrongful convictions were due to
eyewitness misidentification.108 There are a number of different reasons
behind why eyewitness misidentifications are so common, including the
distance of the eyewitness from the crime, the lighting in the area, the race
of the perpetrator, any trauma to the witness, and the method used by the
police to obtain identifications.1 09 With so many variables affecting the
validity of eyewitness identifications and the high percentage of wrongful
convictions based on these identifications, a death penalty sentence should
not be allowed to hinge on an eyewitness identification alone. While
eyewitness identification can be important, it should by no means be the
determining factor in a life or death case. Had this rule been established
when DeLuna was on trial, the likelihood of DeLuna being sentenced to
death probably would have decreased dramatically.I1 0
105 Ryan, supra note 99, at 285.
106 See supra Introduction.
107 See Eyewitness Misidentification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 7,
2014) (stating that eyewitness misidentification played a role in nearly 75% of convictions that were
overturned through DNA testing).
108 Joshua M. Lott, Note & Comment, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After
In Re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 443, 475 (2011).
109 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 107.
110 See infra Conclusion. See generally Michael McLoughlin, Carlos DeLuna Execution: Texas
Put to Death an Innocent Man, Columbia University Team Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2012,
12:00 AM), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2012/05/15/carlos-de-luna-execution-_n 1507003.html
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In 2009, Maryland actually changed its death penalty statute to include a
provision about eyewitness evidence, which provided that the death penalty
is not applicable to a defendant "if the state relies solely on evidence
provided by eyewitnesses." 11' Maryland's revised death penalty statute
also provided that a death penalty sentence may not be given unless the
court or jury is presented with biological or DNA evidence, a videotaped
confession, or a video recording conclusively linking the defendant to the
crime.1 12 Some critics of the revised statute stated that it basically rendered
the death penalty obsolete in Maryland because of the difficulty of
satisfying this high standard.113
While Maryland's statute may have been too extreme, the state had the
right idea in requiring substantive evidence for a death penalty sentence.
State death penalty statutes have aggravating and mitigating factors to help
decide whether a death penalty sentence should be applied.1 4 Most states'
aggravating factors look at the context of the crime and, thus, include
factors such as whether the victim was a police officer, whether the
defendant committed the murder during another felony, and whether the
defendant committed the murder in an extremely cruel manner.1 15
Mitigating factors typically include the defendant's age, whether the
defendant was incapacitated at the time of the crime, and whether the
defendant was under extreme duress.11 6 No current state statute provides
for substantive evidentiary requirements, like Maryland's previous statute
did, or includes the type of evidence needed for a death penalty sentence in
either their aggravating or mitigating factors or other parts of their death
(stating that "eyewitness testimony formed the bedrock of the case.").
Ill MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(c) (repealed 2013) (LexisNexis 2012). Maryland has
since repealed the death penalty, doing so in May 2013. While Maryland's 2009 revised death penalty
statute is no longer in existence, the standards it employed for giving a death penalty sentence are still
relevant and should be considered by those states that still have the death penalty.
112 See id. § 2-202(a)(3).
113 See Michael Drost, House Vote Limits Capital Punishment; Bid to Include Hit men on Shortlist
Rebuffed, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 27, 2009, at A13; see also Steve Lash, Maryland House of
Delegates Passes Death Penalty Measure, 87-52, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, MD), March 27,
2009.
114 See State Death Penalty Laws, PROCONORG,
http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=001172 (last updated Feb. 12, 2014)
(providing links to each state's death penalty statute); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (LexisNexis
2012) (North Carolina's death penalty statute).
115 See State Death Penalty Laws, supra note 113; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)
(LexisNexis 2012) (requiring at least one of twenty-two aggravating circumstances for a death penalty
sentence to be available in Delaware).
116 See Terence Lenamon, Terry Lenamon's List of State Death Penalty Mitigation Statutes, JD
SUPRA (Mar. 10, 2010), http://wwwjdsupra.com/legalnews/terry-lenamons-list-of-state-death-pena-
78641/; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (LexisNexis 2012) (stating mitigating factors to be
considered when determining a death penalty sentence in Delaware).
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penalty statutes. 117 Having such heightened evidentiary requirements,
however, could help to ensure that faulty evidence, such as eyewitness
identifications, does not end up causing an innocent person to be executed.
While no form of evidence is foolproof, heightened requirements could at
least weed out some of the more error prone forms of evidence, thus
bringing states further away from the possibility of executing an innocent.
B. A Proposed Model for Statutory Abrogation in the Context of a
Wrongful Execution: Combining Survival Suits, Damages Caps, and
Evidentiary Materials
A statute passed by Congress abrogating states' sovereign immunity in
the context of a wrongful execution would help to both protect against and
remedy a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. Such a statute could
allow for the decedent's estate to sue via a survival suit. In doing so, the
statute would have to take into account how a wrongful execution could be
established. Proving innocence after death is by no means an easy feat, but
it can be done. For example, Tim Cole was imprisoned for rape and ended
up dying in prison due to an asthma attack.18 Cole was later exonerated
through DNA evidence, making him the first person in the United States to
be posthumously exonerated through DNA evidence. 119 DNA evidence
would certainly be the key in establishing innocence posthumously;
however, prosecutors and courts are often reluctant to allow posthumous
DNA testing.1 20 Other forms of evidence, such as witness recantation,
another's confession, etc., can also be helpful, but, again, it is not easy to
establish these posthumously because of preferences to keep a case closed.
Besides the difficulty of establishing evidence of innocence
posthumously, the courts and the states would not want an abrogation
statute to result in a wrongful execution lawsuit for every person executed.
Therefore, the statute should also include some limitations on when a
117 This is not to say that the states do not provide for a specific burden of proof to be met by the
parties. Typically, once guilt has been established, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that an aggravating factor is met for the defendant to receive the death penalty. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) ("In order for a sentence of death to be imposed, the jury,
unanimously, or the judge where applicable, must find that the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the following aggravating circumstances .... .").
18 See Marice Richter, Tim Cole, Convict Exonerated After Death, Gets Texas Historical Marker,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2012, 6:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/12/convict-
exonerated-after-death n_1272061 .html.
119 See id.
120 See Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 274-75
(2012) (explaining that courts and prosecutors would prefer to keep a case closed, rather than reopening
it).
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decedent's estate can sue for wrongful execution. Significant evidence
should be required for such a lawsuit, and such evidence should result in
the decedent's innocence being proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
evidence would not meet this standard, then a lawsuit should not be
allowed. Where there is a great likelihood that the evidence, if proven in
the decedent's favor, would establish innocence beyond a reasonable doubt,
the courts should be required to allow for posthumous DNA testing and the
admittance of other evidence, so that a viable survival suit can be brought
on behalf of the decedent. This may likely require some sort of pretrial to
help determine the strength of the evidence in question. The exact means
of going about bringing a viable survival suit and proving innocence after
death, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. 121
Additionally, the statute should have a cap on recoverable damages that
takes into account the evidentiary material needed to sentence an individual
to death in the first place. The cap on recoverable damages could be
reduced for states depending upon the type of evidence required by the
state for a death penalty sentence. For example, if state A requires DNA
evidence for a death penalty sentence while in state B any form of evidence
is sufficient so long as the state meets its burden of proof, then the damages
cap for state A should be lower than the cap for state B because A is taking
further precautions to reduce the likelihood of executing an innocent
individual. By undertaking such measures, Congress would be taking steps
to remedy a wrongful execution while also increasing the willingness of the
states to take more precautionary measures when it comes to the death
penalty in order to further protect against the possibility of a wrongful
execution and liability.
Combining all of these components should result in a viable abrogation
statute. However, even if the statute is viable, there are multiple reasons
why people may be wary about abrogating states' sovereign immunity in
the context of a wrongful execution. Tort theories, monetary concerns, and
morality all play a part in determining whether an abrogation statute is a
truly efficient way to deal with a wrongful execution.
121 Using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and an evidentiary hearing to prove innocence
after death is the suggestion of this Note; although, it may be determined that there are other methods of
proving innocence after death that are more viable. Utilizing habeas corpus litigation instead was
considered when writing this Note; however, the holding of Herrera v. Collins weighs against habeas
corpus litigation being a suitable method. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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IV. POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS TO ABROGATION
A. Tort Theories behind Abrogating Sovereign Immunity
There are two fundamental theories behind tort liability: the
instrumentalist theory and the corrective justice theory.1 22 Those who
support the instrumentalist theory believe that individuals should be held
liable for tort law violations because "liability promotes efficient
investments in safety by [imposing] financial consequences on those who
underinvest in safety." 23 Those who support the corrective justice theory
believe that liability forces wrongdoers to provide compensation for harms
caused by their wrongdoings and, therefore, liability embodies wrongdoers'
moral obligations to make up for their wrongs.1 24
These two general theories are clearly applicable to private tortfeasors,
but questions arise as to whether either theory has the same applicability
when it comes to government tortfeasors. The instrumentalist theory is
applicable to private tortfeasors because of profit maximization incentives:
private individuals want to maximize their profits and minimize their costs,
thus if the benefits of taking safety precautions outweigh the costs of
paying liability, private individuals will take those extra measures in order
to avoid the costs of liability.1 25 The government, on the other hand, does
not really have any profit maximization objectives; rather, the government
responds to political incentives. 126 Therefore, even if the costs are high to
the government, as long as the political benefits, such as gaining voter
support, outweigh those costs, the government will take actions that could
increase the likelihood of constitutional tort liability.1 27 The constructive
justice theory is applicable to private tortfeasors because any damages that
the private tortfeasor has to pay to the victim come straight out of the
private tortfeasor's pockets. Any damages a government tortfeasor would
have to pay, however, would come straight out of the taxpayers' pockets.1 28
Therefore, while private tortfeasors feel the burden of compensating their
wrongs, government tortfeasors would not directly feel the burden of such
122 Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 798 (2007).
123 Id.
124 Id
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 824-25.
128 See id. at 798.
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compensation.1 29
If the theories behind tort liability are not really applicable when it
comes to government tortfeasors, then why would holding the state liable
for a wrongful execution be appropriate, or even effective? While the
theories on their face might not seem as applicable to government
tortfeasors, liability would still have compelling affects. Even if the state
cannot reach Pareto efficiency as a private tortfeasor could, the state still
has a loss prevention incentive.o30 While profit maximization is not at the
forefront of a government entity's concerns, state budgets are important.
To pay for liabilities, states could raise taxes, but this would displease the
taxpayers and possibly prevent state government officials from being
reelected.131 Therefore, if Congress were to impose liability for wrongful
executions, states would have to reconsider the budget spending for
corrections to ensure that the budget is allocated efficiently, without having
to raise taxes too drastically (or at all).
Taxpayers, however, are not the ones who committed the constitutional
tort of executing an innocent individual, so why should they be held
accountable via taxes to pay for a state's wrongdoing? The truth, however,
is that, while the taxpayers are not the ones who execute an individual or
choose to ask for a death penalty sentence for a defendant, the taxpayers
are the ones who ultimately give the death penalty sentence in the majority
of states.1 32 Therefore, while one certainly would not blame the average
taxpayer for a wrongful execution, taxpayers are by no means just
bystanders either. Additionally, from a moral standpoint, taxpayers may
support state liability for wrongful execution because "of the widely held
belief that people who are wrongfully injured should be entitled to recover
fair compensation from the wrongdoer." 33 This belief that those
wrongfully injured should be properly compensated was acknowledged by
the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey.134
129 See id.
130 See id. at 843, "[G]ovemmental liability ... will lead to greater investment in loss prevention
than will a nonliability regime." Pareto efficiency occurs at the point when profit maximization and cost
minimization are at equilibrium; additional profits cannot be made without increasing the costs to the
producer beyond the profits.
131 See id. at 832.
132 See Only Juries Can Impose Death Penalty, Supreme Court Rules, CNN JUSTICE (June 24,
2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-24/justice/scotus.executions 1 timothy-ring-death-sentences-
death-row-inmates?s=PM:LAW, stating that a jury must make the findings of fact that result in a death
penalty sentence. States may leave the ultimate life or death decision to a judge, rather than the jury, by
either "requiring a prior jury finding of an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or ... placing the
aggravating factor determination ... in the guilt phase." Id.
133 See Rosenthal, supra note 122, at 838.
134 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) ("[A] person should be compensated fairly
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Even if there are reasons behind having taxpayers pay for the
government's wrong, there is a chance that taxpayers would not even see a
tax raise in the wake of government liability. As discussed infra, imposing
liability in these wrongful death instances may actually have the effect of
reducing costs to the states, thus leaving more money open in state budgets
to pay for any possible liability without having to raise taxes. 135
Should taxes have to be increased, though, the government may find that
any contempt harbored by the taxpayers due to the tax raise is balanced or
outweighed by the taxpayers' growing trust in the state and the criminal
justice system. Imposing liability on the state for a wrongful execution
shows the taxpayers that the state is willing to take responsibility for its
wrongs. The state is acknowledging any flaws it may have, and by
imposing liability, the state will want to reduce these flaws to prevent
liability. Therefore, the state is building trust, within its citizens, of itself
and of its criminal justice system by assuming the responsibility of paying
damages for any wrongful execution. 136
B. Monetary Considerations
As with all things, money is a major concern when it comes to any
actions taken individually or by a government entity. Clearly, an
imposition of liability will have some effect on a state's budget.1 37 The
state only has so much money to spend towards corrections without either
taking money away from other parts of the budget, such as education or
public transportation, or raising taxes. Currently, however, the imposition
of the death penalty is more costly to states than life without parole.1 38 The
higher death penalty costs are not because of the actual execution, but
rather are because of the long trial and appeals processes, which are
necessary in death penalty cases in order to help assure that an innocent
person does not get executed. 139 In California, for example, approximately
$4.6 billion has been spent on the death penalty since 1978.140 These costs
for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.").
135 See infra Part IV.B.
136 See Adam L. Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 238 (2008); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Article,
Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 299 (2012).
137 See Rosenthal, supra note 122, at 845.
138 See To Execute or Note: A Question of Cost?, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29552692/ns/us news-crimeandcourts/tlexecute-or-not-question-
cost/#.VDtVhCtdVRc (last updated Mar. 7, 2009, 4:35 AM).
139 See id.
140 California Cost Study 2011, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/califomia-cost-study-201 1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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are broken down as follows: $1.94 billion for pre-trial and trial costs;
$0.925 billion for automatic appeals and state habeas corpus petitions;
$0.775 billion for federal habeas corpus appeals; and $1 billion for
incarceration. 141 In California, the cost for a convict who receives life
without parole is about $1.598 million in 34 years, without accounting for
inflation; the cost for a convict who is put on death row is about $2.742
million in only 20 years.142
Since the death penalty is much more expensive than life without parole,
imposing liability on the states for a wrongful execution could have a major
cost effect. First, under the proposed abrogation statute, states have an
incentive to increase the evidentiary requirements needed for a death
penalty sentence to be an option. Increased evidentiary requirements
would reduce the number of death penalty eligible defendants; therefore,
some people who may have either received the death penalty, or been
subjected to trials to try to impose a death penalty sentence, would only be
capable of receiving a maximum sentence of life without parole. This
would reduce the costs to the states in the initial trials of death penalty
cases, mandatory appeals, and other procedural steps. Maryland's previous
death penalty statute was the only working model with increased
evidentiary requirements.1 43 An article proposing reform of California's
death penalty statute stated that if California were to impose legislation
similar to that of Maryland's, the state would have "an immediate net
savings of tens of millions of dollars per year."l44 Additionally, fewer
death penalty trials, appeals, and post-conviction proceedings would save
taxpayers millions of dollars per year over time. 145
These great savings in death penalty costs would then be available to the
states to be allocated elsewhere within their corrections budget. The
millions saved could be allocated to any liability suits a state faces because
of a wrongful execution. Therefore, taxes would not have to be increased
because the "additional" money needed to pay for liability suits and
resulting damages would be inherently created from the savings from less
death penalty prosecutions. Additionally, since the proposed legislation
141 Id.
142 Glenn Barr, The Cost of Life without Parole, MOUNTAIN NEWS (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:03 AM),
http://www.mountain-news.com/news/crime log/article4fle45f8-5630-1 leO-93da-
001cc4cOO2eO.html.
143 See supra Part III.A.3. Unfortunately, the effects of these reforms are not readily available.
144 Arthur L. Alarcon & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend
or End the California Legislature's Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L. REv. 41,
221 (2011).
145 See id.
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would incentivize stricter evidentiary standards for a death penalty
sentence, it would also have the hopeful effect of decreasing the possibility
of executing an innocent individual. Thus, the possibility of a state even
facing a suit due to wrongful execution decreases substantially. Therefore,
while the money saved from the legislation is available to be used for any
wrongful execution suits, the likelihood of these suits occurring is so
minimal that states may be able to allocate funds elsewhere.
C The Morality Issue
While the abrogation statute would have the benefit of reducing the
likelihood of executing an innocent individual, it could also cause some
guilty people to avoid execution. One of the stances taken by people in
support of the death penalty is that these people deserve to die because of
the horrific crime they committed. 146 Additionally, the criminal justice
system takes the stance that some people may be convicted of crimes that
they did not commit, but this wrong is necessary in order to prevent crimes
and get retribution from those guilty of crimes. 147 In Herrera, the Court
even said 'due process does not require that every conceivable step be
taken, at whatever cost to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person.' To conclude otherwise would all but paralyze our system
for enforcement of the criminal law."1 48 The chance of guilty murderers not
being sentenced to death could be one that people are not willing to take.
The Court has also said, however, that "death is different in kind from
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."l 49
Since death is different, it should also be treated differently from other
punishments and should have different standards. Executing an innocent
person is not the same as putting an innocent person in prison. If a person
is wrongfully imprisoned, he or she can be released; if a person is
wrongfully executed, he or she cannot return from the dead. This
146 See Thomas W. Clark, Crime and Causality: Do Killers Deserve to Die?, FREE INQUIRY
MAGAZINE, available at http://secularhumanism.org/library/fi/clark_25_2.htm.
147 See D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justied Factual Wrongful
Convictions Rate, 97 J. Crim. L & Criminology 761, 764 (2007), "[Tihe legal system is structured to
operate as if it were controlled by Paleyites . . . ." Paleyites believe that "even though it is wrong to
convict an innocent person, such convictions are not only inevitable in a human system, but represent
the necessary social price of maintaining sufficient criminal law enforcement to provide an appropriate
level of security for the public in general." Id at 763.
148 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
208 (1977)).
149 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); see also Joshua M. Lott, Note & Comment,
The End oflnnocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In Re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 443, 475
(2011) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)).
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difference in permanency calls for a difference in standards and a
difference in the ease with which the punishment is applied. Could actually
guilty people manage to escape a "deserved" death row punishment? Yes,
but that would not mean that the guilty, "deserving" person is now free to
walk the streets. Assuming the State meets its burden of proof, these guilty
individuals are still eligible for life without parole. Thus, saving an
innocent person from the possibility of execution is well worth the
consequence of possibly having to sentence a guilty person to life without
parole rather than execution.
CONCLUSION
Under the proposed abrogation statute, DeLuna's estate would likely
have a strong survival suit against the state and be able to recover for his
execution. The evidence against DeLuna was extremely weak. There was
no DNA evidence linking DeLuna to the murder of Lopez and faulty
eyewitness evidence was the key argument in creating the link. This
evidence or, rather, the lack thereof, combined with the new evidence
uncovered regarding Hernandez, the money, and the state of the crime
scene should pass a beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof with
regards to DeLuna's innocence. Since the State of Texas took minimal
precautions, at least in DeLuna's case, in ensuring that an innocent was not
executed, a survival suit brought by DeLuna's estate would likely result in
Texas having to pay high monetary damages. However, one would hope
that the potential for these high monetary damages would have prevented
Texas from imposing the death penalty in the first place, or at least caused
Texas to find stronger evidence against DeLuna.
As cases such as Carlos DeLuna's exhibit, executing an innocent
individual is very possible and has likely even occurred. Executing an
innocent is a violation of that person's Eighth Amendment rights. With
every violation of someone's rights should come some remedy. By
abrogating states' sovereign immunity in the case of a wrongful execution,
Congress would be creating a remedy for the decedent and forcing the
states to acknowledge the harm done in executing an innocent individual.
Without abrogation, there is currently no remedy in place for the execution
of an innocent; the states can execute an innocent with no consequences to
them. The innocent, however, faces death and the innocent's family loses a
loved one. While nothing can ever fully cure the pain caused by a
wrongful execution, imposing liability upon the states is at least a step in
the right direction to ensure that the states' wrongs are acknowledged and
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that the states do something to reconcile this horrific wrong.
